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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -31,3 +31,7 @@
**Vulnerability:** External shell command executed in `listLocalSnapshots()` triggered a deadlock when `tmutil` output exceeded 64KB, because stdout and stderr were read synchronously inside the process termination handler.
**Learning:** In Swift, reading from a process pipe synchronously inside a `terminationHandler` can result in a permanent deadlock if the child blocks writing to a full pipe, preventing it from exiting.
**Prevention:** Asynchronously drain pipes continuously while the process is running using background queues.
## 2026-06-13 - TOCTOU Vulnerability in File Creation
**Vulnerability:** Found insecure file creation using `Data.write(to:)` followed by `FileManager.default.setAttributes()`, creating a Time-Of-Check to Time-Of-Use window where the file is created with global umask permissions before being restricted.
**Learning:** `Data.write(to:)` creates files using the process's default umask. For privileged daemons, this exposes temporary files to unprivileged users before permissions are tightened.
**Prevention:** Use POSIX `open()` with `O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC` flags and explicitly set the target mode (e.g., `0600`), then wrap the returned file descriptor in a `FileHandle`.
26 changes: 19 additions & 7 deletions Sources/CacheoutHelperLib/SysctlJournal.swift
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -307,14 +307,26 @@ public final class SysctlJournal {
do {
let data = try PropertyListEncoder().encode(state)

// Write to temp file (non-atomic β€” we control the rename ourselves).
try data.write(to: tmpURL)
// Remove any stale temp file to prevent O_EXCL failure
try? FileManager.default.removeItem(at: tmpURL)

// Set permissions to 0600 (root-only) on temp file before rename.
try FileManager.default.setAttributes(
[.posixPermissions: 0o600],
ofItemAtPath: tmpURL.path
)
// Write to temp file securely (0600) to prevent TOCTOU access
let fd = tmpURL.withUnsafeFileSystemRepresentation { pathPtr -> Int32 in
guard let pathPtr = pathPtr else { return -1 }
return open(pathPtr, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_EXCL | O_CLOEXEC, 0o600)

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P2 Badge Restore exact journal permissions after open

When the helper or tests run under a restrictive process umask that masks owner bits (for example umask 0777), the mode passed to open is still filtered by that umask, so this can create and rename a journal with permissions like 000/0400 instead of the 0600 contract asserted by testJournalFilePermissions; flushState() still reports success, and non-root test readers can fail to reopen the file. Calling fchmod(fd, 0o600) after the successful open keeps creation non-world-readable while restoring the exact owner permissions before the rename.

Useful? React with πŸ‘Β / πŸ‘Ž.

}
guard fd >= 0 else {
return false
}

let handle = FileHandle(fileDescriptor: fd, closeOnDealloc: true)
if #available(macOS 10.15.4, *) {
try handle.write(contentsOf: data)
try handle.close()
} else {
handle.write(data)
handle.closeFile()
}

// Atomic rename(2) β€” atomicity on APFS/HFS+.
if rename(tmpURL.path, url.path) != 0 {
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