ci: set explicit read permissions on go-cross workflow#9
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Set an explicit least-privilege permissions block so the workflow GITHUB_TOKEN is scoped to contents: read instead of inheriting the repository default. Signed-off-by: Arpit Jain <arpitjain099@gmail.com>
youkoulayley
approved these changes
Jun 10, 2026
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I work on software supply chain security and have been hardening GitHub Actions workflows across OSS projects.
Each of these workflows runs without a top-level
permissions:block, so itsGITHUB_TOKENinherits the repository (or org) default, which is frequently read/write for all scopes. This PR setspermissions: contents: readat the workflow level for.github/workflows/go-cross.yml, which is all these jobs need (checkout plus the build/test steps). Scoping the token to read-only shrinks what a compromised step or dependency can do, a concern made concrete by the March 2025tj-actions/changed-filescompromise (CVE-2025-30066), where a leaked write-scopedGITHUB_TOKENwas the blast radius.No job behavior changes; the steps already only read the repository.