fix(security): 2 improvements across 2 files#149
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- Security: Command Injection via Unsanitized Shell Command in platformShellQuote - Security: Unsafe Direct Registry Access with Potential TOCTOU in registry_windows.go Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
- Security: Command Injection via Unsanitized Shell Command in platformShellQuote - Security: Unsafe Direct Registry Access with Potential TOCTOU in registry_windows.go Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
fix(security): 2 improvements across 2 files
Problem
Severity:
High| File:internal/detector/shellcmd.go:L12The
platformShellQuotefunction inshellcmd.goattempts to quote strings for shell commands but uses simple string replacement that can be bypassed. On Unix, an attacker can inject commands using$'...'ANSI-C quoting or backtick command substitution. On Windows, the escaping is insufficient against^escape sequences and%VAR%expansion. More critically, this function is used to quote user-controlled paths/arguments before passing toexec.Run, creating potential command injection vectors when combined with other unsafe patterns.Solution
Use
exec.Commandwith separate arguments instead of shell string construction. If shell is required, usesyscall.EscapeArgon Windows and propershlexorstrconv.Quotehandling on Unix. Never build shell command strings by concatenation.Changes
internal/detector/shellcmd.go(modified)internal/detector/registry_windows.go(modified)