π‘οΈ Sentinel: Fix sub-process OS command injection risk - #11
π‘οΈ Sentinel: Fix sub-process OS command injection risk#11piyyy314 wants to merge 2 commits into
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π‘οΈ Sentinel: Mitigate OS command injection risk by disabling shell execution by default
π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: Spawning processes with
{ shell: true }by default insidesub-process.executeruns commands through a system shell interpreter. This exposes the application to OS command injection if unsanitized parameters, arguments, or directory paths are passed.π― Impact: An attacker could potentially inject arbitrary commands if they can manipulate inputs to
sub-process.executecalls.π§ Fix: Updated
sub-process.executeto default toshell: false. Support an explicitshelloption to let callers explicitly opt-in if needed.β Verification: Modified
test/tap/sub-process.test.jsto assert that shell execution does not occur by default but executes when opted in with{ shell: true }.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4898413375584992847 started by @piyyy314