norxs Technology LLC | Safety Engineering, Built from the Ground Up.
The zonal-zero-trust-authenticator is a production-grade, zero-heap C++14 framework that implements a Zero-Trust Continuous Verification model for next-generation Zonal ECU architectures. It replaces the static symmetric keys of traditional SecOC with a full SPDM DSP0274 v1.1 Challenge-Response handshake, HKDF-SHA-256 session key derivation, and a UN R155-mandated periodic session expiry engine — all without a single byte of heap allocation, exception, or OS dependency. The core logic is decoupled from all hardware and OS specifics through a clean Platform Abstraction Layer (PAL), enabling identical source files to compile for Cortex-A53/QNX, Cortex-A53/Linux, and Cortex-M7 bare-metal with only a CMake toolchain switch.
This is the software we build for our clients — shown here as a reference.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Zonal Gateway ECU │
│ (NXP S32G / Cortex-A53 + Cortex-M7) │
│ │
│ ┌───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ SOME/IP Transport Layer │ │
│ └────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ Raw frames (untrusted peer messages) │
│ ┌────────────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ SpdmProtocolEngine (one per zone node slot) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ kUnauthenticated ──► kChallengeSent ──► kAuthenticated │ │
│ │ ▲ │ │ │
│ │ └──────── Revoke() / Reset() ◄───────────┘ │ │
│ │ │ │ │
│ │ ProcessAuthRequest() │ Nonce generated via PAL │ │
│ │ ProcessAuthResponse() │ Signature verified via PAL │ │
│ │ │ Session key derived via PAL │ │
│ └────────────────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ SpdmSessionToken │
│ ┌────────────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ TokenLifecycleManager │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ std::array<TokenSlot, 8> + StaticCircularBuffer<8> (LRU) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ RegisterToken() ValidateToken() RevokeToken() │ │
│ │ EvaluateTokenExpiry() ◄── periodic tick (≤ 15 s interval) │ │
│ │ UN R155 §7.2.2 CS.14 │ │
│ └────────────────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ RevocationCallback │
│ ┌────────────────────────────▼──────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ CryptoPlatformInterface (PAL — pure virtual) │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ GenerateRandomNonce() ComputeSha256() │ │
│ │ VerifyEccSignature() DeriveSessionKey() │ │
│ │ │ │
│ │ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────────────┐ │ │
│ │ │ SoftwareCryptoProvider│ │ HseCryptoProvider │ │ │
│ │ │ (CI / host testing) │ │ (NXP HSE fw v3.x) │ │ │
│ │ │ LFSR-32 · SHA-256 │ │ TRNG · HSE-SHA256 │ │ │
│ │ │ HMAC-HKDF mock │ │ HSE-ECC · HSE-KDF │ │ │
│ │ └─────────────────────┘ └──────────────────────┘ │ │
│ └───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │
│ Memory model: zero heap · std::array · constexpr · .rodata keys │
│ Exception model: zero try/catch/throw · CryptoStatus / SpdmStatus return │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Zone Node Peers (Cortex-M7 Zone Controllers)
│
└── SOME/IP ──► SpdmAuthRequest ──► Zonal Gateway
◄── Nonce challenge
SpdmAuthResponse (ECC-P256 signature) ──►
◄── Session active (AES-256-GCM protected traffic)
| Module | Files | Purpose | Standard |
|---|---|---|---|
| CryptoPlatformInterface | CryptoPlatformInterface.hpp/.cpp |
Pure-virtual PAL for all crypto primitives; SoftwareCryptoProvider mock | ISO/SAE 21434 §10.4.1 |
| SpdmProtocolEngine | SpdmProtocolEngine.hpp/.cpp |
SPDM v1.1 challenge-response FSM; 4-state zero-alloc state machine | DMTF DSP0274, ISO/SAE 21434 §10.4.2 |
| TokenLifecycleManager | TokenLifecycleManager.hpp/.cpp |
Session token table, LRU eviction, periodic expiry, brute-force lockout | UN R155 §7.2.2, ISO/SAE 21434 §10.4.3 |
| StaticCircularBuffer | TokenLifecycleManager.hpp |
Zero-alloc SPSC ring buffer for slot LRU ordering | AUTOSAR C++14 |
| SomeIpAdaptor | SomeIpAdaptor.hpp/.cpp |
SOME/IP SD lifecycle integration: peer offer, SPDM frame dispatch, session tick; Zero-Trust frame gating | AUTOSAR SWS_SD / SWS_SomeIpTp, UN R155 CS.14 |
| ZztaVersion | ZztaVersion.hpp |
AUTOSAR-style SW version constants, packed version word, BSW compatibility check | AUTOSAR SWS_BSWGeneral §7.3 |
Zonal Gateway Zone Node Peer
│ │
│◄── SpdmAuthRequest(client_id, v1.1) ──┤
│ │
│ nonce = TRNG(256 bits) │
│──── nonce ─────────────────────────► │
│ │
│ digest = SHA-256(nonce ∥ client_id)
│ sig = ECDSA-P256(digest, privKey)
│ │
│◄── SpdmAuthResponse(client_id, sig) ──┤
│ │
│ verify ECDSA-P256(digest, sig, pubKey[client_id])
│ session_key = HKDF-SHA256(nonce, client_id)
│ → TokenLifecycleManager.RegisterToken()
│ │
│ AES-256-GCM protected SOME/IP ────►│
IKM = nonce (256 bit) ∥ client_id (64 bit)
Salt = Platform Master Secret (OTP fuse / HSE key slot 0)
Info = "zzta-session-v1" (ASCII, 15 bytes)
PRK = HMAC-SHA256(Salt, IKM) [Extract]
OKM = HMAC-SHA256(PRK, "" ∥ Info ∥ 1) [Expand, T(1) only — 256 bit output]
session_key = OKM → AES-256-GCM key for SOME/IP payload
EvaluateTokenExpiry(current_time_ms): // Called every ≤ 15 s
for each active TokenSlot:
age = current_time_ms - slot.issued_at_ms
if age > kTokenLifetimeMs (30 s):
ZeroSlotSecrets(slot) // volatile byte-write loop
slot.is_active = false
RevocationCallback(slot.client_id) // forces SOME/IP channel teardown
→ SpdmProtocolEngine.Reset() // re-auth required
RevokeToken(client_id, is_anomaly=true):
slot.anomaly_count++
if slot.anomaly_count >= kMaxAnomalyCount (3):
slot.is_locked_out = true
→ RegisterToken() returns kLockedOut for this client_id
→ Permanent block until ECU power cycle
| Check | Result |
|---|---|
try / catch / throw |
0 |
new / delete / malloc / free |
0 |
std::vector / std::map / std::string |
0 |
std::shared_ptr / std::unique_ptr |
0 |
std::mutex / lock_guard |
0 |
| Heap allocation | 0 |
RTTI (dynamic_cast, typeid) |
0 |
| Virtual functions in interface | Only CryptoPlatformInterface |
| Threat | ID | Countermeasure | Implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication Bypass | THREAT-03 | SPDM Challenge-Response | SpdmProtocolEngine FSM guards |
| Replay Attack | THREAT-04 | Per-session random nonce (256-bit) | GenerateRandomNonce() |
| Timing Side-Channel | THREAT-05 | Constant-time volatile accumulator | All comparison paths |
| Key Exhaustion / Brute Force | THREAT-08 | 3-strike anomaly lockout | TokenLifecycleManager |
| Stale Session Exploitation | THREAT-09 | 30 s token expiry + periodic scan | EvaluateTokenExpiry() |
| Requirement | Status | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| CS.14 — Continuous session monitoring | ✅ | EvaluateTokenExpiry() — O(N) bounded |
| CS.15 — Cryptographic agility | ✅ | PAL interface — swap provider without changing FSM |
| CS.16 — Key material erasure | ✅ | ZeroSlotSecrets() volatile loop on all revocation paths |
Full requirement-by-requirement mapping in docs/COMPLIANCE.md (ZZTA-CMP-001).
| Artifact | Standard | Location |
|---|---|---|
| SPDX 2.3 Software Bill of Materials | ISO/IEC 5230 §3.2.1 | sbom/zzta-1.0.0.spdx.json |
| Third-party component inventory + FOSS contact | ISO/IEC 5230 §3.3.1 / §3.1.4 | NOTICE |
| Vulnerability disclosure policy & response SLAs | ISO/IEC 18974 §3.1.4 | SECURITY.md |
| Commit-hash-pinned dependencies | ISO/IEC 18974 §3.3 / NIST CSF ID.SC | CMakeLists.txt (GoogleTest pin) |
| NIST CSF function mapping (Identify→Recover) | NIST CSF | docs/COMPLIANCE.md §4 |
The production library zzta_core has zero third-party dependencies — the
license-obligation and known-vulnerability surface is empty by construction.
GoogleTest is a build-time test dependency only, pinned by immutable commit hash.
Full results in docs/TEST_REPORT.md (ZZTA-VTR-001);
threat-to-test mapping in docs/TRACEABILITY.md (ZZTA-RTM-001).
| Verification Activity | Result |
|---|---|
| Unit + integration tests (GoogleTest, ASan + UBSan) | 81 / 81 PASSED — 7 suites |
| Line coverage (gcovr, production sources only) | 95.2 % (gate ≥ 90 %) |
| Branch coverage | 88.8 % (gate ≥ 85 %) |
| Function coverage | 96.7 % |
| AUTOSAR forbidden-pattern scan | 0 violations |
cppcheck (--enable=all, --error-exitcode=1) |
PASS (3 documented FP suppressions) |
| Doxygen header compliance | PASS — all files |
| Cross-compile: Cortex-A53 + Cortex-M7 | PASS |
| Cortex-M7 stack budget (≤ 1024 B / function) | PASS |
Test suite breakdown:
| Suite | Cases | Focus |
|---|---|---|
SoftwareCryptoProviderTest |
16 | SHA-256 FIPS 180-4 KATs, nonce quality, HKDF key separation |
SpdmProtocolEngineTest |
17 | FSM transition matrix, version gate, signature paths, re-auth |
TokenLifecycleManagerTest |
20 | Token CRUD, expiry, lockout, LRU eviction, ring buffer |
SomeIpAdaptorTest |
17 | SD hooks, malformed-frame rejection, Zero-Trust gating |
FaultInjectionTest |
4 | PAL fault propagation, key zeroization after revoke |
ZztaVersionTest |
3 | Version constants and packed word layout |
IntegrationTest |
4 | Multi-session, key uniqueness, full handshake→expire→re-auth cycle |
- CMake ≥ 3.20
- C++14-capable compiler: GCC ≥ 10, Clang ≥ 12
- For cross-compile targets:
aarch64-linux-gnu-g++(A53),arm-none-eabi-g++(M7)
cmake -B build \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=RelWithDebInfo \
-DZZTA_BUILD_TESTS=ON \
-DZZTA_ENABLE_ASAN=ON \
-DZZTA_ENABLE_UBSAN=ON
cmake --build build --target zzta_tests
ctest --test-dir build --output-on-failurecmake -B build-a53 \
-DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=cmake/Toolchain-A53.cmake \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DZZTA_BUILD_TESTS=OFF
cmake --build build-a53 --target zzta_corecmake -B build-m7 \
-DCMAKE_TOOLCHAIN_FILE=cmake/Toolchain-M7.cmake \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DZZTA_BUILD_TESTS=OFF
cmake --build build-m7 --target zzta_core./scripts/autosar_scan.shThe same scan runs as a gating CI job (Job 4). The former
cmake --build . --target compliance custom target was removed because its
inline shell substitutions broke the Ninja generator; the standalone script
above is the local runner of record.
zonal-zero-trust-authenticator/
├── include/zzta/
│ ├── CryptoPlatformInterface.hpp PAL interface + SoftwareCryptoProvider
│ ├── SpdmProtocolEngine.hpp SPDM FSM + frame DTOs
│ ├── TokenLifecycleManager.hpp Session table + StaticCircularBuffer
│ ├── SomeIpAdaptor.hpp SOME/IP SD lifecycle integration hooks
│ └── ZztaVersion.hpp AUTOSAR-style version constants
├── src/
│ ├── CryptoPlatformInterface.cpp SHA-256, LFSR, HKDF, mock ECC
│ ├── SpdmProtocolEngine.cpp FSM transitions, secret sanitisation
│ ├── TokenLifecycleManager.cpp Token CRUD, expiry scan, lockout
│ └── SomeIpAdaptor.cpp Frame validation, slot pool, Zero-Trust gating
├── tests/
│ └── test_zzta_core.cpp 81-case GoogleTest suite (7 suites, all modules)
├── docs/
│ ├── architecture.md Deep-dive: threat model, data flows
│ ├── TARA.md ISO/SAE 21434 §15 threat analysis (ZZTA-TARA-001)
│ ├── HARA_zonal_zero_trust.md ISO 26262-3 hazard analysis (ZZTA-HARA-001)
│ ├── TEST_REPORT.md Verification & test report (ZZTA-VTR-001)
│ ├── TRACEABILITY.md Threat → code → test matrix (ZZTA-RTM-001)
│ └── COMPLIANCE.md ISO/IEC 5230 · 18974 · NIST CSF mapping (ZZTA-CMP-001)
├── cmake/
│ ├── Toolchain-A53.cmake AArch64 cross-compile (QNX / Linux)
│ ├── Toolchain-M7.cmake ARM Cortex-M7 bare-metal
│ └── zzta-config.cmake CMake package config for find_package(zzta)
├── sbom/
│ └── zzta-1.0.0.spdx.json SPDX 2.3 Software Bill of Materials
├── scripts/
│ └── autosar_scan.sh Local AUTOSAR forbidden-pattern scan
├── .github/
│ ├── workflows/ci.yml 7-job CI pipeline
│ ├── ISSUE_TEMPLATE/bug_report.md
│ └── PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md
├── .clang-tidy AUTOSAR-aligned clang-tidy check set
├── CMakeLists.txt
├── LICENSE
├── NOTICE Third-party inventory + OSS compliance contact
├── SECURITY.md Vulnerability disclosure (ISO/IEC 18974-aligned)
├── CHANGELOG.md
├── CONTRIBUTING.md
└── README.md
This reference implementation is published under the norxs Reference Implementation License v1.0. Commercial use requires a separate license agreement.
norxs Technology LLC offers:
- Full production source rights for ASIL-D deployment
- ISO 26262 safety evidence package (FMEA, FTA, DFA)
- UN R155 / ISO 21434 cybersecurity artifact package (TARA, STRIDE, penetration test report)
- HseCryptoProvider — production implementation for NXP HSE firmware v3.x (S32G, S32K3)
- TrustZoneCryptoProvider — production implementation for Arm TrustZone-M (Cortex-M33)
- ASPICE process documentation
- Long-term engineering support and maintenance
Contact: https://norxs.com
AUTOSAR C++14 · ISO/SAE 21434 · UN R155 · ISO 26262 ASIL-D · DMTF DSP0274 v1.1 · RFC 5869 · FIPS PUB 180-4 · OpenChain ISO/IEC 5230 · ISO/IEC 18974 · NIST CSF · SPDX (ISO/IEC 5962)
(c) 2026 norxs Technology LLC. All rights reserved.