Phase 6c: authentication — tests and doubles

gems/dexpace-core/lib/dexpace.rb

@@ -210,6 +210,42 @@
 require_relative "dexpace/resilience/async_retry_step"
 require_relative "dexpace/resilience/recovery_retry"
 
+# Phase 6c: the authentication layer, in dependency order -- the namespace and the flat
+# resolution error, the private non-blank helper, the closed scheme set, the requirement and
+# the descriptor over it, the resolver, the four credential types, the challenge and its
+# parser, the two challenge handlers and the chain over them, the key stamper, the bearer
+# provider function, the three namespaced errors (filed under auth/, where their constants
+# live), the two bearer stampers, then the two pillar steps, the async one over the sync one.
+# bounded_map.rb, which the Digest handler's nonce store reaches by a bare name, is phase 4a's
+# line above and gains #update in place. `digest` and `securerandom` are required by
+# digest_handler.rb and `strscan` by challenges.rb, each in the file that uses it; all three
+# were on the allowlist before this phase.
+require_relative "dexpace/auth"
+require_relative "dexpace/error/auth_resolution_error"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/validation"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/scheme"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/requirement"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/descriptor"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/resolver"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/bearer_token"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/key_credential"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/named_key_credential"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/password_credential"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/challenge"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/challenges"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/basic_handler"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/unencodable_credential_error"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/digest_handler"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/challenge_handler_chain"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/key_stamper"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/provider_error"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/bearer_provider"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/bearer_stamper"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/async_bearer_stamper"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/https_required_error"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/step"
+require_relative "dexpace/auth/async_step"
+
 # The dexpace Ruby SDK: an HTTP-client toolkit, not an HTTP client.
 #
 # This file issues explicit `require_relative`s for the whole tree rather than using an

gems/dexpace-core/lib/dexpace/auth.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+module Dexpace
+  # The authentication layer (product spec §11, AUTH-1–AUTH-38; design §6.3): the
+  # descriptor/resolver model, the four credential types, the RFC 7235 challenge parser, the
+  # Basic and Digest handlers, the composing chain, the key and bearer stampers, and the AUTH
+  # pillar step on both runtimes.
+  #
+  # Everything here is a value, a pure function or an object a caller constructs and installs;
+  # nothing is registered process-wide and nothing reads Dexpace.configuration (R11: the one
+  # tunable, the Digest nonce store's cap, is a constructor keyword because the handler is
+  # explicitly constructed and was never ambient). The layer depends on phases 0–5 only: it
+  # reads the cross-origin marker phase 4c's cursor carries and never a header (AUTH-29, design
+  # §10.15), gates every replay on phase 3b's Body#replayable? directly (AUTH-31), and takes the
+  # per-nonce counter from phase 4a's BoundedMap by a bare name from a full-nesting body
+  # (AUTH-19).
+  module Auth
+    # AUTH-8: what every credential's #to_s, #inspect and pretty-print show in place of its
+    # secret. One marker for the four types, so a log line reads the same whichever credential
+    # produced it. Distinct from the instrumentation redactor's `***`: that marks a redacted
+    # header VALUE on the way into a log record; this marks a field the object itself refuses
+    # to render, whatever asked.
+    REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
+  end
+end

gems/dexpace-core/lib/dexpace/auth/async_bearer_stamper.rb

@@ -0,0 +1,253 @@
+# frozen_string_literal: true
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+
+require_relative "../auth"
+require_relative "../model"
+require_relative "../error/invalid_argument_error"
+require_relative "../http/headers"
+require_relative "../http/header_syntax"
+require_relative "../clock"
+require_relative "../async/completer"
+require_relative "../async/future"
+require_relative "../error/cancelled_error"
+require_relative "../instrumentation/keys"
+require_relative "../instrumentation/logger"
+require_relative "../instrumentation/contain"
+require_relative "bearer_token"
+require_relative "bearer_provider"
+require_relative "bearer_stamper"
+require_relative "provider_error"
+
+module Dexpace
+  module Auth
+    # AUTH-37, AUTH-36's async half, AUTH-11: the bearer stamper for the async runtime and
+    # 6c's R12 as code. It never calls #value or #wait on any future -- the calling fiber
+    # returns as soon as it has something to hand back -- and it spawns no thread: "kick off an
+    # off-thread background refresh" means calling the provider's async fetch and attaching
+    # #on_settle, and whatever runs the fetch is the provider's own affair (6c's P6-5).
+    #
+    # Three zones, read off one lock-free token reference (XCUT-12): FRESH (not expired with
+    # the margin) stamps and makes no provider call; EXPIRING-BUT-VALID (expired with the
+    # margin, not without it) stamps the still-valid token at once and kicks off a refresh it
+    # does not await; EXPIRED-OR-MISSING settles a Completer of its own from the in-flight
+    # fetch's settlement -- R12's "second #on_settle and a second Completer". Every refresh goes
+    # through ONE single-flight slot: the first caller registers a Completer under @lock and
+    # starts the fetch; every later caller, from either zone, coalesces onto that future. A
+    # failed fetch settles the waiters with the error and caches nothing -- and a fetch that
+    # lands one of AUTH-35's rejections (nil, a non-BearerToken, already expired, or a token
+    # whose wire form the outbound header grammar refuses, BearerStamper's same four) is a
+    # failed fetch: nothing is cached, the waiters fail with a ProviderError, the slot clears
+    # and the next call fetches again. A failed BACKGROUND refresh is reported through
+    # `logger:` as an `http.auth.refresh` diagnostic and fails nothing, since a valid token was
+    # already stamped.
+    #
+    # The fetch is shared; a cancellation is not. The waiter's future is settled FROM the slot's
+    # and never wired back to it: Future#then would register the derived future's cancellation
+    # against its source, which here is the one slot every coalesced caller and every arrival
+    # until the provider settles share, so cancelling one request's future would cancel them
+    # all (review round 2). Cancelling a waiter detaches that waiter alone -- the fetch runs on,
+    # the token is cached, the other waiters stamp it. Only the provider's own settlement
+    # settles the slot, and a cancellation there is forwarded as a cancellation, not as a plain
+    # failure, so `#cancelled?` stays true one link down (SEAM-18, 4c's rule).
+    #
+    # The fetch is started OUTSIDE the lock, and that is not a style choice. AUTH-11's default
+    # wrapper mirrors a sync-only provider's #fetch into an ALREADY-SETTLED future, on which
+    # phase 2's #on_settle runs the block inline on the calling fiber; the settle block takes
+    # the lock to publish the token, and Thread::Mutex is not reentrant, so starting the fetch
+    # inside `synchronize` raises `ThreadError: deadlock; recursive locking` for the commonest
+    # provider shape there is (verified on 3.2.11, 3.4.10 and 4.0.6). Register, release, fetch.
+    #
+    # #stamp_fresh is the post-eviction path AUTH-37's last clause names: it bypasses the
+    # three-zone read and settles on a coalesced fetch, so the retry can never re-send the
+    # token the server just rejected. AsyncStep calls it after a successful eviction, and
+    # #stamp after a failed one, where AUTH-36 says the refreshed token is reused.
+    class AsyncBearerStamper # rubocop:disable Metrics/ClassLength -- R12's two Completers written out: the slot, the waiter settled from it and never wired back, and the one SEAM-18 classification both settle by; see the class comment
+      # @param provider [Object] anything answering #fetch, and optionally #fetch_async
+      # @param clock [_Clock] the time seam; Clock::SYSTEM by default
+      # @param refresh_margin [Numeric] seconds before expiry at which a token is refreshed
+      # @param logger [Instrumentation::Logger] where a failed background refresh is reported;
+      #   Logger::NULL reports nothing
+      def initialize(provider:, clock: Clock::SYSTEM,
+                     refresh_margin: BearerStamper::DEFAULT_REFRESH_MARGIN,
+                     logger: Instrumentation::Logger::NULL)
+        unless BearerProvider.conforms?(provider)
+          raise InvalidArgumentError, "provider must answer #fetch (AUTH-11)"
+        end
+        unless refresh_margin.is_a?(::Numeric) && !refresh_margin.negative?
+          raise InvalidArgumentError, "refresh_margin must be a non-negative number of seconds"
+        end
+
+        @provider = provider
+        @clock = clock
+        @refresh_margin = refresh_margin
+        @logger = Model.required!("logger", logger)
+        @lock = ::Thread::Mutex.new
+        @token = nil #: BearerToken?
+        @in_flight = nil #: Dexpace::Async::Future?
+      end
+
+      # The three-zone policy. Returns a future of the stamped request.
+      #
+      # @param request [Dexpace::Request]
+      # @return [Dexpace::Async::Future]
+      def stamp(request)
+        token = @token # the hot path: no lock (XCUT-12)
+        return awaiting(request) if token.nil?
+
+        case zone(token)
+        when :fresh
+          settled(stamp_with(request, token)) # no provider call
+        when :expiring
+          background_refresh # stamp now, refresh without awaiting
+          settled(stamp_with(request, token))
+        else
+          awaiting(request) # expired
+        end
+      end
+
+      # AUTH-37's post-eviction clause: always a coalesced fetch, never the cache.
+      #
+      # @param request [Dexpace::Request]
+      # @return [Dexpace::Async::Future]
+      def stamp_fresh(request)
+        awaiting(request)
+      end
+
+      # AUTH-36's cache half, identical to BearerStamper#evict_if_matches.
+      #
+      # @param rejected_header [String] the Authorization value the 401 rejected
+      # @return [Boolean] whether the cached token was the rejected one and was evicted
+      def evict_if_matches(rejected_header)
+        @lock.synchronize do
+          token = @token
+          next false if token.nil? || header(token) != rejected_header
+
+          @token = nil
+          true
+        end
+      end
+
+      private
+
+      # AUTH-37's three zones of a cached token, from one clock reading: :fresh (not expired
+      # with the margin), :expiring (expired with the margin, valid without it), :expired.
+      def zone(token)
+        now = @clock.now
+        return :fresh unless token.expired?(now: now, margin: @refresh_margin)
+
+        token.expired?(now: now, margin: 0) ? :expired : :expiring
+      end
+
+      # The expired-or-missing zone's return: this request's own Completer, settled from the
+      # coalesced fetch's settlement and never blocking. Not Future#then -- see the class
+      # comment for why the waiter must not be wired back to the shared slot.
+      def awaiting(request)
+        own = Dexpace::Async::Completer.new
+        refresh_future.on_settle { |settlement| deliver(settlement, request, own) }
+        own.future
+      end
+
+      # The waiter's settlement from the slot's. The rescue keeps a raising stamp on this side of
+      # the settling thread, as a failure of this waiter alone: a cached token has passed the
+      # grammar check, so what is left to raise here is the request's own derivation (a forged
+      # or duck-typed request whose #with refuses), and it must not land on whoever settled the
+      # provider's future.
+      def deliver(settlement, request, own)
+        settle(own, settlement, settlement.error) { |token| stamp_with(request, token) }
+      rescue ::StandardError => error
+        own.fail(error)
+      end
+
+      def header(token) = "Bearer #{token.token}"
+
+      def stamp_with(request, token)
+        request.with(headers: request.headers.new_builder.set("Authorization", header(token)).build)
+      end
+
+      # An already-settled future over a value: the fresh and expiring zones' return.
+      def settled(request)
+        completer = Dexpace::Async::Completer.new
+        completer.fulfil(request)
+        completer.future
+      end
+
+      # The single-flight slot. Under the lock: reuse the in-flight future or register a new
+      # Completer. Outside it: start the fetch. See the class comment for why that order is
+      # load-bearing.
+      def refresh_future
+        completer = Dexpace::Async::Completer.new # discarded when a fetch is already in flight
+        existing = @lock.synchronize do
+          in_flight = @in_flight
+          @in_flight = completer.future if in_flight.nil?
+          in_flight
+        end
+        return existing unless existing.nil?
+
+        start_fetch(completer)
+        completer.future
+      end
+
+      # The fetch, and the one place the token is published. BearerProvider.fetch_async never
+      # raises, so the only way out of here is the settle block, which clears the slot and
+      # writes the cache under the lock and then settles the waiters outside it. A settle
+      # block that raised would propagate into whoever settled the provider's future, so
+      # nothing in it can raise: Completer#fulfil, #fail and #request_cancel report rather
+      # than raise. A provider that cancels its own fetch cancels the slot, and through it every
+      # waiter, as a cancellation.
+      def start_fetch(completer)
+        BearerProvider.fetch_async(@provider).on_settle do |settlement|
+          token = settlement.success? ? settlement.response : nil
+          error = settlement.error || invalid(token)
+          @lock.synchronize do
+            @in_flight = nil
+            @token = token if error.nil?
+          end
+          settle(completer, settlement, error) { token }
+        end
+      end
+
+      # The one classification both completers settle by, Future#then's three rules: a
+      # cancellation of `settlement` stays a cancellation (SEAM-18), any other `error` is the
+      # same object, and a success settles with what the block makes of the response.
+      def settle(target, settlement, error)
+        if error.nil?
+          target.fulfil(yield(settlement.response))
+        elsif settlement.cancelled && error.is_a?(Dexpace::CancelledError)
+          target.request_cancel(error.reason)
+        else
+          target.fail(error)
+        end
+      end
+
+      # AUTH-35's rejections as an error value, or nil for a usable token: BearerStamper#validate's
+      # four, the fourth being a token no outbound header value may carry (HTTP-18) -- cached, it
+      # would fail every later #stamp until it expired, and raise from the fresh zone rather than
+      # settle. The message never carries the token (HTTP-20, AUTH-8).
+      def invalid(token)
+        return ProviderError.new("the provider returned no token (AUTH-35)") if token.nil?
+        unless token.is_a?(BearerToken)
+          return ProviderError.new("the provider returned a #{token.class}, not a BearerToken")
+        end
+        if token.expired?(now: @clock.now, margin: 0)
+          return ProviderError.new("the provider returned a token already expired at fetch time")
+        end
+        return nil if HeaderSyntax.valid_outbound_value?(header(token))
+
+        ProviderError.new("the provider returned a token no outbound header value may carry " \
+                          "(HTTP-18)")
+      end
+
+      # The expiring zone's refresh: coalesced like any other, observed only to log a failure.
+      # AUTH-37: "a failed/unusable BACKGROUND refresh MUST NOT fail the in-flight request
+      # (log-and-continue)" -- there is no in-flight request left to fail.
+      def background_refresh
+        refresh_future.on_settle do |settlement|
+          next if settlement.success?
+
+          Instrumentation.diagnostic(@logger, event: Instrumentation::Events::AUTH_REFRESH,
+                                              cause: settlement.error,)
+        end
+      end
+    end
+  end
+end