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Security: dexpace/dotnet-sdk

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Nothing has been published yet. The three packages under src/ are built, but every one is at 0.0.1-alpha.1 and none is on NuGet, so there is no released version to support and no patched release to point at. Until the first release, the supported revision is the tip of main — report against a commit SHA. Once a version is published, this section will name the supported release lines.

The defects fixed before any release (roadmap phase 1, S1–S9) are listed in CHANGELOG.md under [Unreleased] → Security. Because no consumer could hold an affected version, no advisory was issued for them; that decision is recorded in the phase 1 checklist. From the first published version onward, a vulnerability gets a GitHub security advisory.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue, pull request or discussion for a security vulnerability.

Report it privately by email to oaljarrah@dexpace.org with [SECURITY] in the subject line.

Include what you can of the following:

  • The affected package(s), and the commit SHA and .NET SDK / runtime version you reproduced against
  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact
  • Steps or a proof of concept to reproduce it

You can expect an acknowledgement within a few days. Please allow time for a fix to land and be released before disclosing publicly.

Scope

The SDK is a toolkit: Dexpace.Sdk.Core performs no network I/O of its own. In scope here:

  • Credential handling — the API-key, Basic and bearer-token credentials and auth policies, the access-token cache, the HTTPS-only guard on credentials, and any path by which a credential reaches a log, a trace, an exception message or ToString() output.
  • Redaction — URL, query and header redaction in logging and tracing, including a credential surviving in userinfo or in a query parameter outside the allow-list.
  • Redirect safety — Authorization stripped before every re-issue, Cookie and Proxy-Authorization stripped cross-origin, scheme downgrades, and the SDK remaining the only redirect authority over the transport.
  • Request integrity — header-name and header-value validation (CR/LF injection, request splitting), the framing headers the transport drops, and URL handling.
  • Resource exhaustion — the SDK's own bounded buffers, retry delays and pagination caps.
  • The transport adapter — Dexpace.Sdk.Http.SystemNet, as far as its own mapping, redirect handling and cancellation go — and the Dexpace.Sdk.Serialization.SystemTextJson codec.

Vulnerabilities in the .NET runtime, System.Net.Http, System.Text.Json or Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions themselves belong upstream; report them there, and tell us if the SDK needs a dependency floor raised.

There aren't any published security advisories