chore(deps): update dependency phpunit/phpunit to v12 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #205 · devmehq/devme-sdk-php

renovate · 2026-01-28T03:02:29Z

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
phpunit/phpunit (source)	`10.5.46` → `12.5.22`

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-24765

Overview

A vulnerability has been discovered involving unsafe deserialization of code coverage data in PHPT test execution. The vulnerability exists in the cleanupForCoverage() method, which deserializes code coverage files without validation, potentially allowing remote code execution if malicious .coverage files are present prior to the execution of the PHPT test.

Technical Details

Affected Component: PHPT test runner, method cleanupForCoverage()
Affected Versions: <= 8.5.51, <= 9.6.32, <= 10.5.61, <= 11.5.49, <= 12.5.7

Vulnerable Code Pattern

if ($buffer !== false) {
    // Unsafe call without restrictions
    $coverage = @&#8203;unserialize($buffer);
}

The vulnerability occurs when a .coverage file, which should not exist before test execution, is deserialized without the allowed_classes parameter restriction. An attacker with local file write access can place a malicious serialized object with a __wakeup() method into the file system, leading to arbitrary code execution during test runs with code coverage instrumentation enabled.

Attack Prerequisites and Constraints

This vulnerability requires local file write access to the location where PHPUnit stores or expects code coverage files for PHPT tests. This can occur through:

CI/CD Pipeline Attacks: A malicious pull request that places a .coverage file alongside test files, executed when the CI system runs tests using PHPUnit and collects code coverage information
Local Development Environment: An attacker with shell access or ability to write files to the project directory
Compromised Dependencies: A supply chain attack inserting malicious files into a package or monorepo

Critical Context: Running test suites from unreviewed pull requests without isolated execution is inherently a code execution risk, independent of this specific vulnerability. This represents a broader class of Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) attacks affecting CI/CD systems.

Proposed Remediation Approach

Rather than just silently sanitizing the input via ['allowed_classes' => false], the maintainer has chosen to make the anomalous state explicit by treating pre-existing .coverage files for PHPT tests as an error condition.

Rationale for Error-Based Approach:

Visibility Over Silence: When an invariant is violated (a .coverage file existing before test execution), the error must be visible in CI/CD output, alerting operators to investigate the root cause rather than proceeding with sanitized input
Operational Security: A .coverage file should never exist before tests run, coverage data is generated by executing tests, not sourced from artifacts. Its presence indicates:
- A malicious actor placed it intentionally
- Build artifacts from a previous run contaminated the environment
- An unexpected filesystem state requiring investigation
Defense-in-Depth Principle: Protecting a single deserialization call does not address the fundamental attack surface. Proper mitigations for PPE attacks lie outside PHPUnit's scope:
- Isolate CI/CD runners (ephemeral, containerized environments)
- Restrict code execution on protected branches
- Scan pull requests and artifacts for tampering
- Use branch protection rules to prevent unreviewed code execution

Severity Classification

Attack Vector (AV): Local (L) — requires write access to the file system where tests execute
Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) — exploitation is straightforward once the malicious file is placed
Privileges Required (PR): Low (L) — PR submitter status or contributor role provides sufficient access
User Interaction (UI): None (N) — automatic execution during standard test execution
Scope (S): Unchanged (U) — impact remains within the affected test execution context
Confidentiality Impact (C): High (H) — full remote code execution enables complete system compromise
Integrity Impact (I): High (H) — arbitrary code execution allows malicious modifications
Availability Impact (A): High (H) — full code execution permits denial-of-service actions

Mitigating Factors (Environmental Context)

Organizations can reduce the effective risk of this vulnerability through proper CI/CD configuration:

Ephemeral Runners: Use containerized, single-use CI/CD runners that discard filesystem state between runs
Code Review Enforcement: Require human review and approval before executing code from pull requests
Branch Protection: Enforce branch protection rules that block unreviewed code execution
Artifact Isolation: Separate build artifacts from source; never reuse artifacts across independent builds
Access Control: Limit file write permissions in CI environments to authenticated, trusted actors

Fixed Behaviour

When a .coverage file is detected for a PHPT test prior to execution, PHPUnit will emit a clear error message identifying the anomalous state. This ensures:

Visibility: The error appears prominently in CI/CD output and test logs
Investigation: Operations teams can investigate the root cause (potential tampering, environment contamination)
Fail-Fast Semantics: Test execution stops rather than proceeding with an unexpected state

Recommendation

Update to the patched version immediately if a project runs PHPT tests using PHPUnit with coverage instrumentation in any CI/CD environment that executes code from external contributors. Additionally, audit the project's CI/CD configuration to ensure:

Pull requests from forks or untrusted sources execute in isolated environments
Branch protection rules require human review before code execution
CI/CD runners are ephemeral and discarded after each build
Build artifacts are not reused across independent runs without validation

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.8 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243

Impact

PHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as -d name=value command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP's INI parser interprets " as a string delimiter, ; as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives.

An attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child's configuration, including auto_prepend_file, extension, disable_functions, open_basedir, and others. Setting auto_prepend_file to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process.

Sources of INI values that participate in the attack:

<ini name="…" value="…"/> entries in phpunit.xml / phpunit.xml.dist
INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via ini_get_all()

Threat Model

Exploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project's phpunit.xml, the host php.ini, or the PHP binary's environment. The most realistic exposure is Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE): a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies phpunit.xml to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI system that runs PHPUnit against the PR without isolation. A malicious newline is not visibly distinguishable from a legitimate value in a typical diff review.

Affected component

PHPUnit\Util\PHP\JobRunner::settingsToParameters().

Patches

The fix has two parts:

1. Reject line-break characters

Because a newline or carriage return in an INI value has no legitimate use and is the primitive that enables directive injection, any PHP setting value containing \n or \r is now rejected with an explicit PhpProcessException. This follows the same "visibility over silence" principle applied in CVE-2026-24765: the anomalous state fails loudly in CI output rather than being silently sanitized, giving operators an opportunity to investigate whether it reflects tampering, environment contamination, or an unexpected upstream change.

2. Quote remaining metacharacters

Values containing " or ;, both of which have legitimate uses (e.g., regex-valued INI settings such as ddtrace's datadog.appsec.obfuscation_parameter_value_regexp), are wrapped in double quotes with inner " escaped as \", so PHP's INI parser reads them as literal string contents rather than comment/delimiter tokens. Plain values are forwarded unchanged so that boolean keywords (On/Off) and bitwise expressions (E_ALL & ~E_NOTICE) retain their INI semantics.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible:

Audit INI values: Ensure no <ini value="…"> entry in phpunit.xml / phpunit.xml.dist contains newline, ", or ; characters, and that nothing writes such values into configuration at build time.
Isolate CI execution of untrusted code: Run PHPUnit against pull requests only in ephemeral, containerized runners that discard filesystem state between jobs; require human review before executing PRs from forks; enforce branch protection on workflows that handle secrets (pull_request_target and similar). These mitigations apply to the broader PPE risk class and are effective against this vulnerability as well.
Restrict who can modify phpunit.xml: Treat phpunit.xml as security-sensitive in code review, particularly <ini> entries.
Sanitize host INI: Ensure the host PHP's php.ini does not contain values with embedded newlines or unescaped metacharacters.

References

Fix: https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/pull/6592
Related advisory (same threat class, Poisoned Pipeline Execution): GHSA-vvj3-c3rp-c85p / CVE-2026-24765
OWASP CI/CD Top 10: CICD-SEC-04 Poisoned Pipeline Execution
CWE-88: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/88.html
CWE-93: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.8 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Release Notes

sebastianbergmann/phpunit (phpunit/phpunit)

Conversation

renovate bot commented Jan 28, 2026 • edited Loading Uh oh! There was an error while loading. Please reload this page.

Uh oh!

GitHub Vulnerability Alerts

CVE-2026-24765

Overview

Technical Details

Vulnerable Code Pattern

Attack Prerequisites and Constraints

Proposed Remediation Approach

Rationale for Error-Based Approach:

Severity Classification

Mitigating Factors (Environmental Context)

Fixed Behaviour

Recommendation

Severity

GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243

Impact

Threat Model

Affected component

Patches

Workarounds

References

Severity

Release Notes

v12.5.22

v12.5.21

v12.5.20

v12.5.19: PHPUnit 12.5.19

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.18: PHPUnit 12.5.18

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.17: PHPUnit 12.5.17

Changed

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.16: PHPUnit 12.5.16

Added

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.15: PHPUnit 12.5.15

Changed

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.14: PHPUnit 12.5.14

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.13: PHPUnit 12.5.13

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.12: PHPUnit 12.5.12

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.11: PHPUnit 12.5.11

Deprecated

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.10: PHPUnit 12.5.10

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.9: PHPUnit 12.5.9

Added

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.8: PHPUnit 12.5.8

Changed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.7: PHPUnit 12.5.7

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.6: PHPUnit 12.5.6

Changed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.5: PHPUnit 12.5.5

Deprecated

Fixed

Keep up to date with PHPUnit:

v12.5.4: PHPUnit 12.5.4

renovate bot commented Jan 28, 2026 •

edited

Loading

`v12.5.22`

`v12.5.21`

`v12.5.20`

`v12.5.19`: PHPUnit 12.5.19

`v12.5.18`: PHPUnit 12.5.18

`v12.5.17`: PHPUnit 12.5.17

`v12.5.16`: PHPUnit 12.5.16

`v12.5.15`: PHPUnit 12.5.15

`v12.5.14`: PHPUnit 12.5.14

`v12.5.13`: PHPUnit 12.5.13

`v12.5.12`: PHPUnit 12.5.12

`v12.5.11`: PHPUnit 12.5.11

`v12.5.10`: PHPUnit 12.5.10

`v12.5.9`: PHPUnit 12.5.9

`v12.5.8`: PHPUnit 12.5.8

`v12.5.7`: PHPUnit 12.5.7

`v12.5.6`: PHPUnit 12.5.6

`v12.5.5`: PHPUnit 12.5.5

`v12.5.4`: PHPUnit 12.5.4

`v12.5.3`: PHPUnit 12.5.3

`v12.5.2`: PHPUnit 12.5.2

`v12.5.1`: PHPUnit 12.5.1

`v12.5.0`: PHPUnit 12.5.0

`v12.4.5`: PHPUnit 12.4.5

`v12.4.4`: PHPUnit 12.4.4

`v12.4.3`: PHPUnit 12.4.3

`v12.4.2`: PHPUnit 12.4.2

`v12.4.1`: PHPUnit 12.4.1

`v12.4.0`: PHPUnit 12.4.0

`v12.3.15`: PHPUnit 12.3.15

`v12.3.14`: PHPUnit 12.3.14

`v12.3.13`: PHPUnit 12.3.13

`v12.3.12`: PHPUnit 12.3.12

`v12.3.11`: PHPUnit 12.3.11

`v12.3.10`: PHPUnit 12.3.10

`v12.3.9`: PHPUnit 12.3.9

`v12.3.8`: PHPUnit 12.3.8

`v12.3.7`: PHPUnit 12.3.7

`v12.3.6`

`v12.3.5`: PHPUnit 12.3.5