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Security: blox-eng/goifc

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Threat model

goifc parses IFC/STEP files supplied by third parties — a modeller, a client, an upload. The file is the untrusted input; the caller is not the adversary.

Against that model:

  • A panic, a hang, or unbounded memory growth on a malformed file is a vulnerability. Consumers run this on files they did not author, often in a shared worker, so a crafted file that takes the process down is a denial of service. The parse and geometry paths carry explicit recursion guards and are fuzzed (make fuzz) for exactly this reason.
  • A wrong quantity is a bug, not a vulnerability. Please open an issue.

What is bounded

The work of parsing, extraction, tessellation and storey plans is bounded by the file's size, not only by recursion depth:

  • Each element has a tessellation budget. It counts the work of meshing, the vertices and triangles shipped, and the walk for a fallback box. Past the budget the element's items are boxed; past twice the budget they are left out.
  • Each Build has a budget sized to the file: 512 units per instance, plus one element budget. A shape, face or profile shared by thousands of elements cannot cost each of them a full element budget. Past the Build budget, the remaining elements are boxed, one box each; past twice it they are left out. Which elements those are is settled in element order, so it is the same on every run.
  • Storey plans are charged per vertex and triangle they cut, against a budget sized to the file, and test each element only against the storeys its height reaches. A parent cycle is detected, not followed.
  • Property sets that many elements share are read once and shared. Copies made to merge a type's sets into an occurrence's are charged to a budget.
  • Relationships are looked up by index, so an N-element relationship costs N, not N².
  • Recursion has explicit depth guards on the parse and geometry paths.

Every budget that runs out says so in the result's warnings. An element over its own budget is named; the Build, storey-plan and property-set budgets give a count of what they boxed or left out. No model in the coverage corpus reaches any of these budgets.

What is still not bounded:

  • Elevations, net areas and facade classification. Scene.Elevations, Scene.NetAreas and BuildFacings are charged to no budget, and their work can grow faster than the file: elevations scan every element once per height band. BuildImport runs Scene.NetAreas, so it is not bounded as a whole until these are (#142).
  • The file itself. goifc holds the parsed file in memory, in proportion to its size. Limit the size of the uploads you accept.
  • Cancellation. Build takes no context.Context, so a caller cannot stop it early. Its time is bounded, but a deadline needs the caller's own process or worker limit.

A file that makes goifc's work or memory grow faster than its size is a vulnerability under the threat model above. Please report it.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please report security vulnerabilities privately via GitHub Security Advisories for this repository, rather than opening a public issue.

Include as much detail as you can: the affected version, a minimal reproduction (ideally an IFC/STEP fragment that triggers the issue), and the impact you believe it has.

There is no guaranteed response time or support SLA. This is maintained on a best-effort basis.

There aren't any published security advisories