Add open source project intake system

[michaeloboyle]

Summary

Implements the Agentics Foundation Open Source Committee's project intake pipeline, translating Nick Ruest's governance proposal into an automated GitHub-native workflow.

What this PR adds:

• 14-state machine with 17 guarded transitions covering the full lifecycle: submission, triage, scoring, escalation vote, validation vote, approval/decline/deferral, monitoring, and retraction
• 6 GitHub Actions workflows automating triage, scoring, escalation, validation, approval registration, and retraction
• BDD specifications (80+ scenarios, 1,311 lines of Gherkin) traceable to governance document items
• 129 unit tests (all passing) covering workflow guards, state transitions, and edge cases
• Governance agent (RVF) for case brief generation, score tabulation, and attestation logging
• Submission template with 7 required fields and 5 project categories
• Approved project registry (data/approved-projects.json) with conflict-safe rebase strategy

Governance Fidelity

Reviewed against the governance proposal by a 5-expert panel (governance compliance, security, OSS foundation standards, OIA architecture, BDD/testing). Key findings:

Area	Status
5 submission categories	Implemented
7 required fields	Implemented
Scoring rubric (5 criteria, 0-5)	Implemented
Escalation vote	Implemented
Validation vote	Implemented (adds approve-with-conditions)
Retraction process	Implemented (re-scoring enforcement pending)
State machine / formal spec	Addition (beneficial, no governance-doc counterpart)
Member-only eligibility	Partial (self-attestation, no automated check)
Scoring confidentiality	Deviated (public, attributed -- governance doc says confidential)
Quorum	Dynamic (computed from data/committee-config.json)

Overall: 75% of governance requirements implemented. The process automation is above-average for a foundation this young. The state machine, phase guards, and BDD traceability are innovations most mature foundations lack.

State Machine

14 states, 17 transitions, 15 named guards. All transitions are directional (no backward flow except deferred-to-resubmission).

flowchart TD
    A([Member Submits Project]) --> B[Triaged]
    B --> C[Scoring<br/>5 criteria, 0-5 each]
    C -->|quorum scored| D{Escalation Vote}
    D -->|majority: escalate| E[Escalated to<br/>Senior Leadership]:::terminal
    D -->|majority: no escalate| F{Validation Vote}
    F -->|approve| G[Approved]:::success
    F -->|approve w/ conditions| H[Approved with<br/>Conditions]:::success
    F -->|decline| I[Declined]:::terminal
    F -->|defer or tie| J[Deferred]:::warning
    J -.->|resubmission| A
    G --> K[Monitoring]:::active
    H --> K
    K -->|committee proposes| L[Retraction<br/>Proposed]
    G -->|committee proposes| L
    L -->|rescoring complete| M{Retraction Vote}
    M -->|majority: retract| N[Retracted]:::terminal
    M -->|failed| K

    classDef terminal fill:#dc3545,color:#fff,stroke:#dc3545
    classDef success fill:#28a745,color:#fff,stroke:#28a745
    classDef warning fill:#ffc107,color:#000,stroke:#ffc107
    classDef active fill:#0d6efd,color:#fff,stroke:#0d6efd

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Security Controls

P0 fixes implemented and verified (129 tests passing):

Control	Description	Status
Phase guards	All 5 workflows validate current state before executing	✅
Submitter exclusion	Issue author cannot vote on their own retraction	✅
Idempotency	Approval and retraction check for existing registry entries	✅
Vote queuing	cancel-in-progress: false prevents concurrent votes from being dropped	✅
Approve-with-conditions	Registration triggers on both status:approved and status:approved-with-conditions	✅
Dynamic quorum	Computed from data/committee-config.json instead of hardcoded 3	✅
CI pipeline	npm test runs on all PRs	✅

Residual Risks

The following attack vectors are not yet mitigated.

TODO: Create tracking issues once maintainer access is granted.

Risk	Vector	Severity
No membership verification	Anyone with a GitHub account can submit	Medium
Score confidentiality	Individual scores posted publicly, violating charter S9	Medium
Edited vote comments	A voter could change their vote after tally by editing the comment	Medium
Resubmission flooding	No cooldown on deferred-to-resubmission cycle	Low
Retraction without re-scoring	/retract can jump to vote without re-scoring step	Medium
Missing /coi workflow	CoI parser exists but no command handler	Low
Bot-comment filtering	Phase guard checks bot comments but no dedicated filtering	Low
Injection via issue fields	No sanitization tests for issue title/body content	Low

What This PR Does NOT Include (Policy Layer)

The panel review identified that the process machinery is sound, but the policy layer needs work before production.

TODO: Create tracking issues once maintainer access is granted.

1. No IP policy (CLA/DCO) -- Required before accepting any project donation. Recommendation: adopt DCO (--signoff).
2. No trademark/brand policy -- "Foundation-Endorsed" status needs legal definition.
3. No security disclosure policy -- No SECURITY.md requirement for submitted projects.
4. No appeals process -- Declined submissions have no recourse.
5. No defined SLA or meeting cadence -- No timeline guarantees for submitters.

These are policy decisions for the committee, not code changes. They should be resolved before the first real submission.

Testing

• 129 unit tests (workflow-guards library): all passing
• 80+ BDD scenarios (Gherkin): specification documents with governance-doc traceability
• BDD executability: Gherkin files are not yet wired to a Cucumber runner. They serve as traceable specifications today, with a path to executable tests.

Files Changed

39 files, +9,638 lines across:

• .github/workflows/ -- 6 workflow files + CI
• .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ -- submission template
• lib/ -- state machine, workflow guards, vote parser, registry manager
• features/ -- BDD specifications (7 feature files)
• data/ -- committee config, approved projects registry, governance agent data
• test/ -- unit tests for workflow guards

How to Review

1. Start with the state machine: lib/state-machine.js defines all 14 states and 17 transitions
2. Read the BDD specs: features/*.feature files map 1:1 to governance document sections
3. Check the workflows: .github/workflows/ for the automation layer
4. Run tests: npm test (129 tests, all passing)

Related

• Governance proposal: Google Doc
• Expert panel review: conducted 2026-04-30 (5 experts, 18 consolidated recommendations)
• P0 fix branch: feature/p0-state-guards-submitter-exclusion-idempotency

[michaeloboyle]

Security Audit — 16 Findings (2 Critical, 4 High, 5 Medium, 3 Low, 2 Info)

Merge Blockers

SEC-001/002 — CRITICAL: Shell Injection Pattern
approve-project.yml and retraction.yml use core.exportVariable() to set PROJECT_ID and ISSUE_NUMBER, then interpolate them in shell run: steps. While current values are safe (integers), this establishes a dangerous pattern. Use core.setOutput() and step outputs instead.

SEC-003 — HIGH: No Access Control on Voting
Any GitHub user who can comment can cast /vote approve, /score, etc. No verification of org membership, team membership, or author_association. Three burner accounts can approve any project. This alone should block merge.

Remediation: Check context.payload.comment.author_association or verify membership in a open-source-committee GitHub Team.

SEC-004 — HIGH: Direct Push to Main
approve-project.yml commits and pushes directly to the default branch, bypassing branch protection. Should create a PR instead, or at minimum respect branch protection rules.

SEC-005 — HIGH: Race Condition on Registry
Concurrent approvals/retractions will checkout the same approved-projects.json, and the second git push fails silently. Also causes duplicate project IDs (computed from registry.length + 1). Use issue number as ID and atomic file API.

SEC-006 — HIGH: Actions Not Pinned to SHA
All actions use mutable major version tags (@v4, @v7). Pin to full SHA hashes and add Dependabot for updates.

Pre-Production

SEC-007 — MEDIUM: Markdown Injection via User Input
User-controlled "Full Name" rendered directly in comments. Sanitize inputs before embedding.

SEC-008 — MEDIUM: DoS via Comment Spam
Every /vote comment triggers a full workflow run that paginates all comments and posts a tally. Add concurrency groups and rate limiting.

SEC-009 — MEDIUM: No JSON Schema Validation
Registry read/write has no schema validation. Malformed file crashes workflows.

SEC-010 — MEDIUM: Tie-Breaking Favors Approval
1-1-1 vote results in APPROVED. Use strict majority (> not >=), default to DEFERRED on ties.

SEC-011 — MEDIUM: Retraction Cannot Be Opposed
Only /vote retract exists, no /vote no-retract. 3 of 10 members can retract without opposition.

Backlog

SEC-012 — LOW: Submitter can vote on own submission
SEC-013 — LOW: Bot comments not filtered from tally; logic bug in escalation regex (line 284 double-negative)
SEC-014 — LOW: setup-labels.sh uses --force without confirmation, no input validation
SEC-015 — INFO: contents: write permission broader than necessary
SEC-016 — INFO: No immutable audit log; edited comments retain counted votes

Recommended Priority

Priority	Findings
Before merge	SEC-003, SEC-006, SEC-001, SEC-002
Before production use	SEC-004, SEC-005, SEC-008, SEC-010, SEC-011
Short term	SEC-007, SEC-009, SEC-012, SEC-013
Backlog	SEC-014, SEC-015, SEC-016

[Copilot]

Pull request overview

Implements a GitHub-native intake + governance workflow for open source project submissions, including a formalized state machine, slash-command parsing, RVF intelligence helpers, and multiple GitHub Actions workflows to automate scoring/voting/registry updates.

Changes:

• Added governance core libraries (state machine, RVF helpers, slash command parsing) plus unit tests.
• Added GitHub Actions workflows for submission triage, scoring, escalation/validation voting, approval registration, and retraction.
• Added supporting docs/specs/data (Gherkin specs, retraction spec, scoring template, RVF seed data, simulation scripts).

Reviewed changes

Copilot reviewed 39 out of 39 changed files in this pull request and generated 13 comments.

Show a summary per file

File	Description
lib/state-machine.js	Encodes the governance state machine and guard logic for transitions.
lib/commands.js	Parses /score, /vote, /coi, and /override commands for workflow/agent use.
lib/rvf.js	Loads RVF graph/embeddings and provides CoI + similarity + attestation helpers.
.github/workflows/on-submission.yml	Applies initial category label and posts a welcome comment on new submissions.
.github/workflows/scoring.yml	Parses /score comments and posts score tables + applies scoring label.
.github/workflows/escalation-vote.yml	Tallies escalation votes and sets escalation/validation labels.
.github/workflows/validation-vote.yml	Tallies validation votes and sets final outcome labels (approve/decline/defer/conditions).
.github/workflows/approve-project.yml	Registers approved projects into data/approved-projects.json.
.github/workflows/retraction.yml	Handles /retract proposal and retraction vote + registry update.
scripts/*	Adds workflow verification and end-to-end simulation helpers.
test/*.test.js	Adds unit tests for state machine, RVF utilities, and command parsing.
features/*.feature	Adds BDD specifications for eligibility/scoring/voting/retraction examples.
spec/retraction.yaml	Defines retraction rules/process and the retraction-specific state machine.
README.md, docs/scoring-template.md	Documents submission process, scoring rubric, and commands.
data/*	Adds approved-projects registry scaffold and RVF seed datasets/logs.

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[michaeloboyle]

Replacement PR opened: #6.

The new PR is on the feature branch feature/p0-state-guards-submitter-exclusion-idempotency rather than michaeloboyle:main, addresses the three P0 governance gaps (phase guards, submitter exclusion, idempotency), and disposes of all 13 Copilot review comments from 2026-04-30. Tip: b00caac. Tests: 129/129 across 13 suites.

Leaving #4 open for committee triage. Once the committee selects a head to review, the other can be closed.