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test: pin the trusted_exec_path contract in the policy crate - #32
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trusted_exec_path treats a bare argv[0] as trusted because the backend resolves bare names only from the sandbox's fixed PATH (a system-tree set the guest cannot write). That reasoning was implicit; these tests pin it from the policy side — bare names and the read-only system tree are trusted, relative/traversal forms and guest-writable locations and lookalike prefixes are refused — so a change on either side of the contract fails CI.
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Summary
Part 10 of 12 in the exec-resolution fix series.
policy::trusted_exec_pathtreats a bareargv[0]as trusted because the backend resolves bare names only from the sandbox's fixedPATH(GUEST_PATH— a system-tree set the guest cannot write). That reasoning was implicit; these tests pin it from the policy side so a change on either side of the contract fails CI:/bin,/usr,/sbin,/lib64) → trusted..traversal (even inside an absolute path), guest-writable locations (/workspace,/tmp,/home), and lookalike prefixes (/usrfoo/) → refusedTest plan
cargo test -p toolcage-policy --lib: 12 passed (5 new)cargo test --workspace: 51 suites, 0 failed-D warnings: clean