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πŸ”΅ Splunk SOC Investigation Lab β€” BOTSv3

Splunk SIEM ATT&CK Status

SOC triage case study using Splunk, Windows Security logs, and Sysmon to investigate authentication anomalies, anomalous PowerShell execution, and suspected C2 beacon activity β€” using the public Boss of the SOC (BOTSv3) dataset.


πŸ“‹ Executive Summary

Investigation of 1,280,642 BOTSv3 events identified one high-priority host (FYODOR-L) exhibiting strong indicators of active post-exploitation and C2 communication. FYODOR-L generated 3,911 PowerShell-related Sysmon events β€” compared to fewer than 10 on most peer hosts β€” with powershell.exe executing as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM and making repeated outbound HTTPS connections to 45.77.53.176 (Vultr-hosted infrastructure) in a consistent, beacon-like pattern.

Three additional hosts showed low-severity authentication anomalies requiring monitoring but no immediate escalation.

FYODOR-L is the primary host of interest and the recommended escalation priority.

SOC Dashboard


🎯 Objective

Perform end-to-end SOC analyst triage across 1,280,642 events in the BOTSv3 dataset using Windows Security and Sysmon telemetry. Identify suspicious authentication activity, anomalous PowerShell execution, and potential command-and-control (C2) behavior. Produce a structured analyst assessment with IOCs, MITRE ATT&CK mappings, and escalation recommendations.


πŸ”¬ Environment

Component Detail
Platform Splunk Enterprise (local lab)
Dataset Boss of the SOC v3 (BOTSv3) β€” public Splunk lab dataset
Log Sources WinEventLog:Security, XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
Total Events 1,280,642
Investigation Date March 2026

🚨 Key Findings

Finding 1 β€” Failed Logon Attempts (Event ID 4625)

  • Hosts: MKRAEUS-L, SEPM (Γ—2)
  • Volume: 3 events total
  • Analysis: Volume is well below brute-force threshold. No lateral movement indicators observed from these hosts in the same timeframe. No associated successful logons from unexpected sources.
  • Disposition: βœ… Closed β€” low-severity authentication noise, no escalation required

Failed Logons


Finding 2 β€” Authentication Volume by Host (Event ID 4624/4625)

  • Host of note: BSTOLL-L generated the highest successful logon volume (171 events) in the reviewed dataset window
  • Analysis: Elevated logon count on BSTOLL-L warrants validation against the host's expected role and baseline behavior. Without an established baseline this is inconclusive, but the volume is sufficient to flag for monitoring. Follow-up investigation would include reviewing associated logon types, source IPs, and whether any privileged accounts were used.
  • Disposition: ⚠️ Monitor β€” validate BSTOLL-L activity against expected host role

Auth Events


Finding 3 β€” Anomalous PowerShell Volume (Sysmon)

Host PowerShell Events
FYODOR-L 3,911 ← significant outlier
ABUNGST-L 1,079
BGIST-L 4
BSTOLL-L 2
  • Analysis: FYODOR-L generated PowerShell activity approximately 3.6Γ— higher than the next closest host and 390Γ— higher than baseline peers. This volume alone is sufficient to flag FYODOR-L for priority investigation.
  • Disposition: πŸ”΄ Escalate β€” anomalous outlier, investigate immediately

PowerShell Volume


Finding 4 β€” Suspected PowerShell-Based C2 Activity on FYODOR-L ⚠️ HIGH SEVERITY

This is the primary finding of this investigation.

Raw Sysmon event review of FYODOR-L revealed the following:

  • powershell.exe executing under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (process path: C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe)
  • Repeated outbound HTTPS (port 443) connections to 45.77.53.176, resolving to 45.77.53.176.vultr.com β€” a Vultr-hosted VPS with no legitimate business justification
  • Events occurred in a consistent, beacon-like pattern across multiple timestamps within the same minute window
  • Source port varied per connection; destination port was consistently 443
  • Activity initiated from FYODOR-L.froth.ly β€” a non-standard hostname suggesting a lab/compromised environment

Assessment: SYSTEM-level PowerShell beaconing to an external cloud VPS over HTTPS in a regular interval pattern is high-confidence post-exploitation behavior. This is consistent with an attacker-controlled implant or C2 framework (e.g., Empire, Cobalt Strike, Metasploit handler) maintaining persistence on FYODOR-L.

C2 Beacon

Beacon Frequency Analysis:

SPL analysis using rex field extraction and streamstats confirmed the connection frequency to 45.77.53.176:

Metric Value
Total connection events to C2 IP 3,858
Average interval between events <1 second
Min interval <1 second
Max interval <1 second

Sub-second connection logging across 3,858 events indicates high-frequency automated beaconing β€” consistent with an active C2 implant maintaining persistent communication. This is not human-initiated activity.

Beacon Interval Analysis

Recommended escalation actions:

  1. Isolate FYODOR-L from the network immediately
  2. Pull full CommandLine values from Sysmon Event ID 1 on FYODOR-L
  3. Check for persistence mechanisms: scheduled tasks, registry run keys, new services
  4. Review FYODOR-L user account activity for privilege escalation indicators
  5. Submit 45.77.53.176 for threat intel enrichment (VirusTotal, Shodan, AbuseIPDB)
  6. Capture and analyze HTTPS session content if network forensics are available
  • Disposition: πŸ”΄ Escalate β€” high-confidence C2 activity, isolate host

🧠 Analyst Assessment

FYODOR-L was the unambiguous primary host of interest in this investigation. Its PowerShell Sysmon event volume was an extreme statistical outlier compared to all peer systems. Direct event review confirmed powershell.exe running as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM β€” an unusual privilege level for interactive or scheduled PowerShell use β€” with repeated, sub-second outbound HTTPS connections to a Vultr-hosted IP address across 3,858 logged events.

The combination of SYSTEM-level execution, external C2 IP, high-frequency beacon pattern, and extreme event volume constitutes a high-confidence indicator of active post-exploitation. This host should be treated as compromised pending forensic confirmation.

Investigation Limitations: This analysis was limited to Windows Security and Sysmon telemetry. Network flow data (NetFlow/PCAP) and endpoint memory forensics were not available in this dataset. Full confirmation of C2 payload and implant type would require packet capture analysis of the HTTPS sessions to 45.77.53.176 and memory acquisition from FYODOR-L.


πŸ“Š Investigation Summary

Finding Host Severity Disposition
Failed logon attempts MKRAEUS-L, SEPM 🟒 Low Closed
Elevated authentication volume BSTOLL-L 🟑 Medium Monitor
Anomalous PowerShell volume FYODOR-L πŸ”΄ High Escalate
Suspected PowerShell C2 beacon FYODOR-L πŸ”΄ High Isolate + Escalate

πŸ” SPL Searches Used

Failed Logon Detection

index=botsv3 sourcetype="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode=4625 earliest=0
| table _time, host, user, src_ip, LogonType

Authentication Activity by Host

index=botsv3 earliest=0 (EventCode=4624 OR EventCode=4625)
| stats count by EventCode, host
| sort -count

PowerShell Activity by Host

index=botsv3 sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=0 PowerShell
| stats count by host
| sort -count

Suspicious PowerShell Investigation on FYODOR-L

index=botsv3 sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=0 host="FYODOR-L" PowerShell
| table _time, host, Image, User, DestinationIp, DestinationHostname, DestinationPort, CommandLine

PowerShell ScriptBlock Volume on FYODOR-L

index=botsv3 sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" earliest=0 PowerShell host=FYODOR-L
| stats count by ScriptBlockText
| sort -count
| head 10

C2 Beacon Frequency Analysis β€” FYODOR-L

index=botsv3 sourcetype="XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
host=FYODOR-L "45.77.53.176" earliest=0
| rex field=_raw "Name='DestinationIp'>(?<dest_ip>[^<]+)"
| where dest_ip="45.77.53.176"
| sort _time
| streamstats current=t last(_time) as prev_time by host
| eval beacon_interval_sec=round((_time - prev_time), 2)
| where beacon_interval_sec >= 0
| stats avg(beacon_interval_sec) as avg_interval_sec,
        min(beacon_interval_sec) as min_interval_sec,
        max(beacon_interval_sec) as max_interval_sec,
        count as total_beacons by host

πŸ—ΊοΈ MITRE ATT&CK Mapping

Technique ID Evidence
PowerShell T1059.001 powershell.exe executing as SYSTEM with 3,911 Sysmon events on FYODOR-L
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols T1071.001 Outbound HTTPS to 45.77.53.176 β€” 3,858 sub-second beacon events
Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059 Broad PowerShell-based execution behavior across investigation
System Services / Scheduled Task (suspected) T1053 Not confirmed β€” recommended follow-up investigation for persistence

πŸ“ Repository Structure

splunk-soc-lab/
β”œβ”€β”€ README.md
β”œβ”€β”€ screenshots/
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 01-botsv3-dataset-loaded.png
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 02-failed-logons-4625.png
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 03-logon-activity-by-host.png
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 04-powershell-activity-by-host.png
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 05-fyodor-c2-beacon.png
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ 06-soc-dashboard-complete.png
β”‚   └── 07-beacon-interval-analysis.png
β”œβ”€β”€ searches/
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ failed_logons.spl
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ auth_events_by_host.spl
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ powershell_activity_by_host.spl
β”‚   β”œβ”€β”€ suspicious_powershell_c2.spl
β”‚   └── beacon_interval_analysis.spl
└── report/
    └── investigation-summary.md

πŸ… Skills Demonstrated

  • Splunk SPL investigation across 1.28M events including rex, streamstats, and eval
  • Windows Security and Sysmon log analysis (Event IDs 4624, 4625, Sysmon 1/3)
  • C2 beacon identification and frequency analysis
  • MITRE ATT&CK mapping
  • Structured SOC escalation reporting

πŸ”‘ IOCs Identified

Type Value Context
IP Address 45.77.53.176 Suspected C2 destination β€” Vultr VPS infrastructure
Hostname 45.77.53.176.vultr.com Resolved hostname for C2 IP
Host FYODOR-L Compromised endpoint β€” primary host of interest
Process powershell.exe (SYSTEM) Execution under NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM β€” anomalous
Port 443 (HTTPS) C2 communication channel β€” encrypted beaconing

Built by Lovedip Singh β€” SOC Analyst portfolio project focused on Splunk, Sysmon, and Windows event investigation.
Last updated: April 2026

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Splunk SOC investigation lab using Windows Security and Sysmon logs detects failed logons, anomalous PowerShell execution, and C2 beacon activity across lab endpoints using the BOTS v3 dataset

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