Fix Cxx WebSocket write queue state #31
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| # @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture — issue_comment is not fork-restricted; runs with full secrets regardless of PR origin | |
| name: AI code review (command) | |
| # On-demand, ONE-SHOT reviewer triggered by a PR comment (maintainers only): | |
| # /review run once now; the router picks the agents | |
| # /review all run once with every agent | |
| # /review correctness security run once with just those agents | |
| # This never changes configuration. CONTINUOUS review is configured in | |
| # expo-code-review.yml (the `pull_request` workflow) via the `review.trigger` | |
| # policy in .expo-code-review/config.jsonc and the `ai-review:skip` label. | |
| on: | |
| issue_comment: | |
| types: [created] | |
| # Comment-only: read the repo, write PR comments (issue comments API). | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| issues: write | |
| env: | |
| # Published reviewer run via npx (override with repo variable ECR_VERSION; pin to | |
| # a specific version to freeze it). Used for the guard AND the review so the engine | |
| # that clears a config is the same engine that then reads it. | |
| ECR_VERSION: ${{ vars.ECR_VERSION || '0.14.0' }} | |
| concurrency: | |
| group: ai-code-review-cmd-${{ github.event.issue.number }} | |
| cancel-in-progress: true | |
| jobs: | |
| command: | |
| # Only PR comments starting with /review, from a maintainer. | |
| # @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture [implements] — gate controls who triggers, not what code runs | |
| if: >- | |
| github.event.issue.pull_request != null && | |
| startsWith(github.event.comment.body, '/review') && | |
| contains(fromJson('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association) | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| # Bound the run so a slow/stalled review fails fast rather than hanging. Keep it | |
| # above the passes budget (budget.totalPassesMinutes, 55m) + coordinator (10m) + | |
| # verification + setup, like the auto-review workflow's cap. | |
| timeout-minutes: 90 | |
| # A reviewer failure must never fail the PR's checks. | |
| continue-on-error: true | |
| steps: | |
| # @ref LLP 0009#workflow-security-posture [implements] — comment body only via env:; agent ids sanitized before reaching argv | |
| - name: Parse command | |
| id: cmd | |
| env: | |
| # Via env (never inline ${{ }}) so an untrusted comment can't inject shell. | |
| COMMENT: ${{ github.event.comment.body }} | |
| run: | | |
| line=$(printf '%s' "$COMMENT" | head -n1 | tr -d '\r') | |
| verb=$(printf '%s' "$line" | awk '{print $1}') | |
| rest=$(printf '%s' "$line" | cut -s -d' ' -f2-) | |
| # Only /review (one-shot). Continuous review is policy/label-driven, not a | |
| # comment; /review no longer changes any configuration. | |
| if [ "$verb" != "/review" ]; then | |
| echo "run=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"; exit 0 | |
| fi | |
| # Bare "/review" -> router picks; "all" -> every agent; names -> subset. | |
| # Sanitize agent ids to [a-zA-Z0-9,_-] to keep the value shell-safe. | |
| agents="" | |
| route=false | |
| if [ -z "$rest" ]; then | |
| route=true | |
| elif [ "$rest" != "all" ]; then | |
| agents=$(printf '%s' "$rest" | tr ' ' ',' | tr -cd 'a-zA-Z0-9,_-') | |
| fi | |
| { | |
| echo "run=true" | |
| echo "agents=$agents" | |
| echo "route=$route" | |
| } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT" | |
| - name: Acknowledge | |
| if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| run: gh api -X POST "repos/${{ github.repository }}/issues/comments/${{ github.event.comment.id }}/reactions" -f content=eyes | |
| # SECURITY: `issue_comment` is NOT fork-restricted by GitHub — it always | |
| # runs in the base-repo context with full secrets and a write-scoped token, | |
| # regardless of whether the commented-on PR is from a fork. We check out ONLY | |
| # the trusted base ref (the default branch) for the `.expo-code-review/` | |
| # config, and never `gh pr checkout` the PR head. The reviewer engine itself | |
| # is the PUBLISHED @expo/code-review-cli (fetched by npx), not built from any | |
| # checkout, so attacker-controlled PR code never runs here. The diff + PR | |
| # metadata come from the API (`gh pr diff`/`gh pr view`); `ecr ci` loads | |
| # configuration from the PR's immutable base commit and reads source from a | |
| # head worktree scrubbed of ambient runtime config (opencode.json, plugins, | |
| # AGENTS.md, .env, …) — the same trust model as the pull_request workflow. | |
| - name: Checkout (base ref only — never the PR head) | |
| if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| fetch-depth: 1 | |
| # The CLI's own git fetches authenticate through `gh` from GH_TOKEN, so | |
| # the token never lands in .git/config. | |
| persist-credentials: false | |
| - name: Set up Node | |
| if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0 | |
| with: | |
| node-version: 24 | |
| # The reviewer runs via npx and never installs with a package manager, so | |
| # disable setup-node's auto package-manager cache (its post step would try | |
| # to save an empty cache and error). | |
| package-manager-cache: false | |
| # SECURITY: the base-ref checkout above includes every .expo-code-review/ | |
| # config.jsonc + routing.jsonc, whose auth.tokenEnv names the env var the CLI | |
| # forwards as the model credential. The canonical guard ships with the CLI: | |
| # `ecr verify-config` sweeps every config (root + routing + all scopes, referenced | |
| # or not) with the engine's real JSONC parser and refuses unless tokenEnv appears | |
| # exactly once, in a ROOT-owned file, equal to ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV — so a | |
| # base-ref config change can't repoint it at another runner secret, sneak in a | |
| # JSON-escaped key, or stage an unreferenced scope config with its own auth. | |
| # This is layer 2; layer 1 is the runtime ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV lock in `ecr ci`. | |
| # Runs after Set up Node so the guard runs the SAME $ECR_VERSION `ecr ci` will. | |
| # @ref LLP 0009#guard-step-ordering-and-job-budgets [implements] — same $ECR_VERSION feeds guard and review | |
| - name: Guard config tokenEnv (root + routing + all scopes) | |
| if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| env: | |
| # (Comma-separated set for a multi-credential auth.providers config.) | |
| ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV: ${{ vars.ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV || 'META_API_KEY' }} | |
| run: npx --yes -p "@expo/code-review-cli@$ECR_VERSION" ecr verify-config | |
| - name: Run AI review | |
| if: steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| continue-on-error: true | |
| env: | |
| GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }} | |
| # Layer-1 auth lock: the CLI refuses to run when the tokenEnv it would honor | |
| # differs from this. Keep it in sync with the guard's EXPECTED. | |
| ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV: ${{ vars.ECR_EXPECTED_TOKEN_ENV || 'META_API_KEY' }} | |
| # Model credential — the env var named by auth.tokenEnv in config.jsonc. | |
| # Store each as a repo secret under the same name. | |
| # Updated per your setting: secret is EXPO_CODE_REVIEW_API_KEY, forwarded as META_API_KEY | |
| META_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.EXPO_CODE_REVIEW_API_KEY }} | |
| # Optional search-only credential for trusted platform documentation research. | |
| BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY: ${{ secrets.EXPO_BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY }} | |
| # Optional: override the model for every agent. | |
| REVIEWER_MODEL: ${{ vars.REVIEWER_MODEL }} | |
| AGENTS: ${{ steps.cmd.outputs.agents }} | |
| ROUTE: ${{ steps.cmd.outputs.route }} | |
| # NOTE: running via `issue_comment` makes this a manual /review, which the CLI | |
| # detects (GITHUB_EVENT_NAME=issue_comment) and treats as a trigger-gate bypass | |
| # — it reviews even when the config trigger policy or an `ai-review:skip` label | |
| # would skip the auto workflow. The bypass affects ONLY the trigger gate; the | |
| # config guard above, break-glass, and the auth lock still apply. | |
| run: | | |
| # Array (not a string) so the flags expand as separate argv entries | |
| # without unquoted word-splitting. AGENTS is a single sanitized, | |
| # space-free comma list, so it stays one element. | |
| ARGS=() | |
| if [ -n "$AGENTS" ]; then | |
| ARGS=(--agents "$AGENTS") | |
| elif [ "$ROUTE" = "true" ]; then | |
| ARGS=(--route) | |
| fi | |
| npx --yes -p "@expo/code-review-cli@$ECR_VERSION" ecr ci "${ARGS[@]}" | |
| # Same ephemeral per-run log as the pull_request workflow — a /review command | |
| # runs the full `ecr ci`, whose .expo-code-review/.runs/ log is gone when the | |
| # runner tears down. always() captures it even on error, gated on run=='true' | |
| # (a non-/review comment writes no log); issue.number IS the PR number here | |
| # (issue_comment context has no pull_request.number). | |
| - name: Upload review run log | |
| if: always() && steps.cmd.outputs.run == 'true' | |
| uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1 | |
| with: | |
| name: review-run-log-pr${{ github.event.issue.number }} | |
| path: .expo-code-review/.runs/reviews.jsonl | |
| if-no-files-found: ignore | |
| retention-days: 14 |