Severity: Low. A release-checklist item, not a defect today. From the 2026-08-25 contract read-through.
docs/index.html:191 and docs/index.html:325 both tell the buyer they sign an EIP-3009 TransferWithAuthorization. That is correct for the deployed v1.3.0 and wrong the moment v1.4.0 (#64) is activated: #35's fix makes every call site the receive variant, and the two typehashes are distinct (interfaces/IEIP3009.sol:25-34).
The timing is the whole point. Fixing it now would make the public site describe a signature the live deployment rejects — the same failure in the other direction. This belongs in the v1.4.0 rollout, not before it.
Failure scenario if it is missed: after activation the landing page is the most discoverable rail0 documentation there is, and it names the one typehash that reverts at the token. An integrator who trusts it wires a signer that fails on every payment, with nothing in the error pointing back at the page.
Suggested fix: add to the v1.4.0 release checklist (#64) — flip both TransferWithAuthorization mentions in docs/index.html to ReceiveWithAuthorization, in the same change that moves the site's version. The site already needed a version correction once (#42), so the checklist is the right place for this class of thing rather than a separate pass.
Worth considering while in there: whether the site should name the variant at all. It is a detail that has now rotted twice, and "the buyer signs an EIP-3009 authorization" carries the same meaning to the audience the landing page is written for. The precise typehash matters to integrators, who belong in the README.
Severity: Low. A release-checklist item, not a defect today. From the 2026-08-25 contract read-through.
docs/index.html:191anddocs/index.html:325both tell the buyer they sign an EIP-3009TransferWithAuthorization. That is correct for the deployed v1.3.0 and wrong the moment v1.4.0 (#64) is activated: #35's fix makes every call site the receive variant, and the two typehashes are distinct (interfaces/IEIP3009.sol:25-34).The timing is the whole point. Fixing it now would make the public site describe a signature the live deployment rejects — the same failure in the other direction. This belongs in the v1.4.0 rollout, not before it.
Failure scenario if it is missed: after activation the landing page is the most discoverable rail0 documentation there is, and it names the one typehash that reverts at the token. An integrator who trusts it wires a signer that fails on every payment, with nothing in the error pointing back at the page.
Suggested fix: add to the v1.4.0 release checklist (#64) — flip both
TransferWithAuthorizationmentions indocs/index.htmltoReceiveWithAuthorization, in the same change that moves the site's version. The site already needed a version correction once (#42), so the checklist is the right place for this class of thing rather than a separate pass.Worth considering while in there: whether the site should name the variant at all. It is a detail that has now rotted twice, and "the buyer signs an EIP-3009 authorization" carries the same meaning to the audience the landing page is written for. The precise typehash matters to integrators, who belong in the README.